

POWER (assuming other players are rational) (in weak sense; define)

CONSIDER "POWER" AS "ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE VALUE OF A GAME, OR DECISION PROBLEM, FOR A GIVEN PLAYER" (1) (a) "perceived"; (b) "actual," "post hoc"  
(2) AS "ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE OPTIMAL STRATEGY FOR A GIVEN PLAYER IN A GIVEN GAME OR DECISION PROBLEM"; (Influence; political science)<sup>(a)</sup>; <sup>(b)</sup>  
(3) AS "ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE VALUE OF A GAME TO ONESELF." (Hobbes, Lasswell)

A particular player will be interested in having power in sense (3); this may ~~will~~ depend upon his ~~xx~~ power in sense (2) (though it might not, if he could improve his own payoffs without changing other player's behavior, perhaps at the cost of worsening other of his payoffs); and power in sense (2) may depend ~~in~~ on power in sense (1): e.g., if new optimal strategy has lower payoff for other player, it must be possible to reduce value of the game for him, i.e. ensure that other strategies (including his old optimal strategy) have still lower expected value (though (2) may not be necessary to (2); it may be possible to switch opponent's optimal strategy without affecting value of game to him; i.e., new optimal strategy may have ~~same~~ expected outcome as old).

ALL OF THESE MAY BE BASED UPON: (A) ABILITY TO CHANGE OPPONENT'S PAYOFFS, OR (B) HIS EXPECTATIONS, OR (C) HIS DEGREE OF "IGNORANCE" OR AMBIGUITY, OR (D) HIS DECISION RULE UNDER UNCERTAINTY, OR (E) HIS SET OF AVAILABLE ACTIONS, OR (F) HIS "OUTCOME" FUNCTION (as distinct from payoffs, or criterion function), OR (G) ONE'S OWN OUTCOME FUNCTION, OR (H) SET OF AVAILABLE ACTIONS, OR (I) OPPONENT'S BELIEFS AS TO (G), (H), OR ONE'S EXPECTATIONS OR PAYOFFS.